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I. Constitutionally, there are two different categories of 
federal property, governed by two different constitutional clauses:
A. Federal enclaves, and
B. Other federal property,
II. Federal enclaves are governed by U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17, here called the "enclave clause."
A. The "enclave clause" provides that Congress shall 
have power:
"To exercise exclusive Legislation in all 
Cases whatsoever, over such District . . .  as 
may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the 
United States, and to exercise like Authority over 
all Places purchased by the Consent of the 
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall 
be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful 
Buildings . . . ."
B. Probably contrary to the original intent, this 
clause was long construed to exclude all state 
jurisdiction over "enclaves?" it was as if the 
enclave were outside the boundaries of the host 
state, or "extraterritorial."
1. Reily v. Lamar, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 344, 356-57 
(1805).
2. United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 653 
(No. 14, 868) (C.C.D.R.I. 1820).
C. This principle of "extraterritoriality" and 
exclusive federal governmental jurisdiction even 
precluded Congress from voluntarily giving states 
jurisdiction over enclaves.
1. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 
(1885).
2. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 
(1930) .
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3 . Cook, 281 U.S. 647
III.
Surplus Trading Co._v.
(1 9 3 0 ).
D. Decisions during the Supreme Court's 1937 term 
confused Article I enclave principles with Article 
IV property clause principles and countenanced 
divided jurisdiction over enclaves; this change of 
doctrine was then implemented by statute.
1. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 
(1937).
2. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186 
(1937).
3. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 
U.S. 518 (1938).
4. Act of Oct. 9, 1940, cl. 793, § 355, H8, 54 
Stat. 1083, 40 U.S.C. § 255.
E. Later, the traditional principle of 
"extraterritoriality" of enclaves was explicitly overruled.
1. Howard v. Comm'rs of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953).
2. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
F. More recently, the "extraterritoriality" principle 
has again become the rule of decision at least once.
1. United States v. State Tax Comm'n of 
Mississippi, 412 U.S. 363 (1973).
2. As a result, enclave doctrine is utterly confused.
3. Where there is an agreement âs to divided 
jurisdiction over an enclave, it will 
probably control, subject to preemption.
All other federal property is governed by U.S. Const.,
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, here called the "property clause."
A. The property clause provides that "Congress shall 
have Power to dispose of and make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States."
B. Traditional case law distinguished between
territories" outside state boundaries, and "other
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property" owned by the United States within the boundaries of a state.
C. As to territories, there being no other sovereign, 
the United States enjoyed both proprietorship and 
general governmental jurisdiction.
1. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
2. This rule was derived independently of the 
property clause, but came to be associated 
with that clause.
D. . As to other federal property, the United States
enjoyed proprietorship rights, but general 
governmental jurisdiction resided in the States, 
not in the United States.
IV. The traditional rule as to "other property" was 
complicated but cleár.
A. Under a rule predating the Constitution and based 
onlanguage in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 
Congress had the exclusive right of first disposal 
of federal property; consequently State 
conveyancing laws and adverse possession laws 
could have no effect. E.g.,
1. Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879).
2. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 
(1872) .
3. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 
526 (1840).
B. Federal property could be put to use under the 
necessary and proper clause to effectuate some 
federal power independent of the property clause, 
in which case federal laws ordaining that federal 
use could preempt conflicting state laws, and 
state laws could not interfere with that federal 
use.
1. This rule was independent of the property 
clause itself, and rested on two distinct 
constitutional doctrines of general 
applicability:
a. The necessary and proper power; and
b. The doctrine of intergovernmental 
immunities.
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2. Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885)
C. In ways "necessary and proper" to protect federal 
property, Congress could act to protect federal 
property as a private proprietor could not.
1. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 
(1897).
2. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
3. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
D. In all other respects, the property clause was 
held to confer upon Congress only proprietorship 
powers, and no powers of general governmental
j urisdiction.
1. As proprietor, the United States enjoyed a 
private landowner’s remedies,
a. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 
How.) 229 (1851).
b. United States V. Gear, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 
120 (1845).
2. Because administraton of federal property was 
a function of proprietorship, not of 
sovereignty, administrative functions could be delegated without the restraints 
applicable to delegation of legislative powers.
3.
a. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
b. Cf. Schechter v. Schechter Poultry 
Corp., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Federal policies and laws based only on the 
property clause were subordinate to, and 
could not preempt, State laws. E.g.,
a. Ward v. Race Horse. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
b. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).
c. Omaechevarria v. Idaho. 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
Colorado vc Tollf 268 U.S. 228 (1925).
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V. Aggressive federal policies and inept, legal reasoning 
set the stage for radical and unreasoned doctrinal change.
A. The issues were seldom litigated during the 
formative era of federal property policy*
B. The "proprietorship" concept was confused with the 
unrelated concept of "proprietary" (vs. 
"governmental") powers.
C. A fundamental mistake in analysis of federal 
powers, widespread early in this century until 
corrected in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941), infiltrated and has not yet been exorcised 
from property clause thinking.
D. Intellectual confusion spawned a notion of general 
federal legislative jurisdiction over federal 
property? and that notion predominated by default, 
without judicial endorsement.
1. Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of 
Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the 
States, Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas 
Within the States, Parts I and II (1957).
2. Public Land Law Review Commission, Report,
One Third of the Nation's Land, at 278 
(1970).
VI. In 1976 the Supreme Court revolutionized property 
clause doctrine.
A. The Court construed the property power as a power 
of general legislative jurisdiction, capable of 
preempting state law.
1. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
2. The Court provided no policy rationale for 
the change in doctrine.
3. The Kleppe briefs obscured the precedents.
4. The shock of change in the public lands 
States has fueled the "Sagebrush Rebellion."
B. The revolution has been expanded, still without 
rationales Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
_____ F. 2d _____ (9th Cir. 1979), affirmed
without opinion, 48 U.S.L.W. 3625 (1980).
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C. It is too early to judge whether the revolution is permanent or whether competent constitutional 
analysis will prevail.
FOR FURTHER STUDY see "State and Federal Power Over Federal 
Property," 18 Arizona Law Review 283 (1977), reprinted in 14 
Public Land and Resources Law Digest 269 (1977).
